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Abstract 
This paper brings together issues lingering around regulation in microfinance institutions by 
examining the effects of regulation and country effect. Using an unbalanced panel data from 
2002 to 2012 for 30 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and employing multilevel estimation 
technique, the study reveals that regulation helps to improve the sustainability and breadth of 
outreach but not depth of outreach. Also country effect plays significant role in MFIs 
activities. It is imperative for regulatory authorities to devise strategies to strengthen MFIs 
financial position as well as ensuring enabling environment that will enhance the 
achievement of microfinance social objectives. 
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Introduction 
The extent of government involvement in the governance of financial intermediation is on the 
ascendancy and regulation of MFIs exists to ensure that they operate in a sound environment 
in order not to harm the unbanked poor. From public policy perspective, regulation is 
underscored by market failure arising from asymmetric information, market power and 
negative externalities (Freixas & Rochet, 1997). These arguments are most relevant to 
regulation in microfinance. In view of the burgeoning issues, the present concern of this 
paper is to examine the effect of regulation on MFIs sustainability and outreach in SSA. 
 This paper borrows from the empirical literature on non-financial firms and employs 
multilevel estimation technique to explain the effect of regulation on MFIs outreach and 
sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of 
regulation on MFIs core objectives; outreach and sustainability. Using the cross-section time-
series variation in our sample of MFIs spanning from 30 countries in SSA from 2002 to 2012. 
To answer the question, the study borrows from empirical works of bank regulation literature 
that has at length examined literature on bank performance analysis that extensively dealt 
with issues concerning regulating financial institutions or banks. The intent for this paper is 
to add to present arguments for and against regulation of microfinance institutions. To date, 
no study has attempted to empirically use multilevel methodology to evaluate how regulation 
affect the two objectives of microfinance: sustainability and outreach MFIs in SSA. This 
article evaluates whether regulating MFIs would best be of immense help for the MFIs while 
executing their core objectives. 
 The paper argues that regulation could be of great importance to the MFIs but if done 
inappropriately could be detrimental. It uncovers empirical evidence consistent with 
sustainability and outreach of MFIs but reveals a double-edged finding on the outreach of 
MFIs.  Institutions that strive to maintain their core objective have to face some trade-off 
between serving the poorest of the poor or only the marginal poor. Specifically, the paper 
establishes the following empirical facts: (1) regulation helps to improve the sustainability 
and breadth of outreach of MFIs; (2) regulated institutions offer larger loan sizes to the poor 
and serve fewer women; (3) countries with a high official supervisory power (regulatory 
quality) have positive outcome on outreach and sustainability and (4) institutions that accept 
deposits from the poor have better sustainability but such institutions tended to serve the 
marginal poor. The remaining of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides review 
of literature, section 3 presents the methodology, Section 4 examines data for the study and 
section 5 presents the results and discussions whiles section 6 concludes with policy 
recommendations. 
 
Literature Review 
The transformation MFI into regulated institutions has been discussed under studies such as 
the transformation of Bolivian PRODEM into BancoSol (Rhyne, 2001). A study by Arun 
(2005) and Brau and Woller (2005) on regulation which focused on the experience of 
individual countries or group of countries with MFI regulation. The point of agreement 
between value research and of microfinance practitioners is that deposit-taking institutions 
should be subject to prudential regulation, while those that do not collect deposits from the 
public but operate with private donations instead, should not (Chaves & Gonzalez-Vega, 
1994).  Cull et al (2009) in their paper draw an important distinction between prudential and 
non-prudential regulation. According to the distinction, regulation is prudential when it is 
aimed specifically at protecting the financial system as a whole as well as protecting the 
safety of small deposits in individual institutions. In Bangladesh as an example, many poor 
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clients lost their savings due to improper and fraudulent action of little known unregulated 
institutions (Wright, 2000). MFIs that fall under deposit-taking and donor-funded only 
categories should be under some form of tiered regulation, with licensing and monitoring 
linked to the sources of funds and the clients served (Van Greuning et al., 1999; Hardy et al., 
2003). 
 Typically banking regulations in most countries do not cover microfinance activities. 
Changes in regulation mechanisms and laws that cover microfinance activities usually result 
from active promotion by large microfinance networks such as ACCION International 
operating mainly in Latin America or when the MFI sector becomes more active in their 
operations and thus draws the attention of the regulator. The lack of regulations has had both 
positive and negative consequences. Taking Ghana for instance where microfinance activities 
has brought the attention of the Bank of Ghana that many people have their monies locked 
up. Noninvolvement by the regulators makes establishing and operating an MFI easier. This 
scenario is exactly what helped MFIs in some Latin American Countries in their early stages 
and helped laid the foundation for the sector (Christen and Rosenberg, 2000). However, 
ambiguity in regulation leaves MFI being at risk to regulatory discretion in the interpretation 
of the legal basis for lending activity, as happened in Russia (Safavian, et al. 2000). 
Currently, some MFIs operate as regulated or non-regulated. That is  MFIs can be subject to 
either mandatory entry regulation, prudential regulation, or some sort of entry regulation 
(tiered regulation).  
 
Sustainability, Outreach and Regulation 
 It is believed that when MFIs are regulated, they will be able to utilize private, 
unsubsidized sources of funding to raise capital in order to grow and serve more clients. In 
becoming regulated, these institutions now have a “double bottom line”: a financial objective 
of sustainability to satisfy their funders in addition to their social objective of outreach 
(CGAP, 2004). Originally, most MFIs rely on donations and subsidies for funding. Because 
these sources of funds are vulnerable to shocks, many MFIs chose to attract private sources of 
funds. These private sources of funding include: deposits, loans from commercial banks, 
bond issuances and other short-term financial liabilities. By accessing deposits and loans 
from commercial sources, regulated MFIs can grow and avoid a liquidity crunch by tapping 
commercial sources of funding (Berger et al, 2006). The emphasis on Sustainability should 
also be important to MFIs, especially, if they hope to help their clients out of poverty because 
their survival as organizations matters. 
 The regulation of microfinance has raised concerns regarding mission drift arising 
from the tension of the “double bottom line”. Serving the poorest clients has the highest 
average costs, which could impact negatively on sustainability and outreach. Thus, if the 
financial objective outweighs the social objective for the MFI then outreach will likely suffer. 
In addition, MFIs may move “up market” (Swanson, 2008) with their more successful clients. 
This shift away from poorer potential clients would again indicate mission drift. Bateman 
(2009) points out the enormous benefits for those promoting regulation, but not for the poor 
on the receiving end. Regulation has gained momentum in the microfinance industry both in 
magnitude and as a percentage of total funding (Garmaise et al, 2010). Some within the 
industry have also called for the future of the microfinance industry to be driven by 
commercial MFIs. Among the best-practice model that emerged within the international 
development community envisaged the provision of microfinance through market-driven, 
independent, commercially oriented, and financially self-sustaining MFIs (Harper, 2011). 
Whether this regulation trend has had an impact on the industry’s sustainability and outreach 
is an important question to address.  
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Methodology 
Theoretical Model Specification 
 Giving the heterogeneous nature of MFIs in SSA and in most cases mission driven, 
investigating how regulation influences outreach and sustainability is important. 
Understanding of the factors that may influence these missions of MFIs come from a model 
that explores the possibility of matching managers and principals in mission driven 
organizations such as MFIs, as developed by Besley and Ghatak (2007). The authors show 
that a change in mission can occur as a result of competition for donations. Donors, therefore, 
would be willing to support an MFI if they are assured that the original mission will be 
sustained. Thus: 
 
                                                 ܻ ൌ ݂ሺܴ, ܨݔ,ܯሻ                                        (1) 
 
Where ܻ is performance variable of the financial institution, ܴ is regulatory framework 
variable, ܨݔ is Financial institutions specific characteristics and ܯ is macroeconomic and 
institutional characteristics.  
 In this model it could be inferred that mission drift among the financial institutions 
can occur as a result of competition for donations. Again, donors are likely to support MFIs if 
they are assured that the original mission will be maintained. The model predicts that 
managers would perform better in organizations with large endowments as they are less 
likely to be forced to adjust their mission to attract donations. The model also predicts that 
competition among mission-driven organizations improves efficiency because it improves 
matching between donors and managers and thus improves managers’ incentives. Consistent 
with the literature and following works on analysis of bank performance, Barth et al., (2004) 
and (Berger, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, & Haubrich, 2004), and adapting the bank performance 
model, outreach and sustainability (performance) of MFIs is specified as: 
 
ܱݑݐ	݋ݎ	ܵݑݏݐ ൌ ݂ሺܴ, ܼݔ,ܯݒሻ                                     (2) 
 
Where ܱݑݐ	݋ݎ	ܵݑݏݐ is outreach or sustainability by the MFI, ܴ is the regulatory variable, Zݔ 
is (MFI) specific characteristics and ܯݒ is macroeconomic and institutional characteristic. 
 
Empirical Model Specification 
In line with the above model, the empirical model for MFI which specifies outreach or 
sustainability as a function of MFI specific variables, macroeconomic and institutional factors 
and regulatory framework is specify as: 
 
ܱܷܴܶ௜௝௧ ൌ ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܴ݁݃௜௝ ൅	෍ ߚଶ_௠
ହ
௠ୀଵ
ܼ௜௝௧ ൅෍ߚଶ_௡
ଷ
௡ୀଵ
ܥ ௝ܸ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧					ሺ3ሻ 
ܷܵܵ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൌ ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܴ݁ ௜݃௝ ൅ 	෍ ߚଶ_௠
ହ
௠ୀଵ
ܼ௜௝௧ ൅෍ߚଶ_௡
ଷ
௡ୀଵ
ܥ ௝ܸ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧									ሺ4ሻ		 
where ܱܷܴܶ௜௝௧, ܷܵܵ ௜ܶ௝௧ are outreach and sustainability variables for MFIs ݅ in country ݆ at 
time ݐ  ܴ݁ ௜݃௝ captures the effects of regulation by MFI; ܼ௜௝௧ is a vector of MFI specific 
variables (Age, Deposit, Capital, Interest Rate(Rate), Mfi type, ); ܥ ௝ܸ௧	are macroeconomic 
country-specific variables (inflation (CPI), GNI per and regulatory quality), ߝ௜௝௧ is MFIs 
specific error term. 
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Estimation Technique 
 The empirical analysis uses panel data of different levels where one level of data is 
nested in another. Thus, MFIs data nested in country data, the model is as a mixed or nested 
model set which can also be termed as a hierarchical model. Having such model that 
comprises different levels of data requires a first step to determine what empirical estimation 
technique to use and the most appropriate. The study then employs a two stage multilevel 
model to deal with this hierarchical nature of data structure. The multilevel analysis 
employed is highly relevant in this study because the model structure of the study involves 
different levels. Changes in MFI activities vary substantially in structure and also across 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the study area is composed of mixture of groups 
(countries which is seen as a higher level variable) and MFIs (individuals seen as a lower 
level variable) and hence such study can be termed as a study that involves a hierarchical 
data. The arguments justifying the use of multilevel models to analyse hierarchical data in 
addition are well known in the literature (Goldstein, 2011; Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). 
According to arguments pose, when units are clustered, classical regression analysis are not 
appropriate since the underlying hypothesis of independence of the observations is violated. 
Again, in the case of this study, MFIs in the same countries tend to be more similar to each 
other than those in different countries. As a result of this dependency, using classical 
regression analysis leads to downward bias standard errors and, hence, inferences about the 
effects of the covariates might be spurious (Hox, 1995). A standard solution to such a 
problem is to use robust methods for estimating the standard errors. Hence, multilevel models 
are more appropriate. In this model, two levels of measurement are estimated. One equation 
capturing MFI level of measurement and other capturing country variables.  
 
Outreach and Sustainability Models 
In the first stage, lower level (MFI characteristics) is specified as: 
ܱܷܴܶ௜௝௧݋ݎ	ܷܵܵ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൌ ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܴ݁ ௜݃௝ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ௠ܼ௜௝௧ହ௠ୀଵ ൅
ߝ௜௝௧………………………………(5) 
In the second stage, the units of analysis are groups: 
ߚ଴௝௧ ൌ ߚ଴଴ ൅ ∑ 	ߚ଴ଵ_௞ܥ ௝ܸ௧ଷ௡ୀଵ ൅ ߤ଴௝௧
ߚଵ௝௧ ൌ 																															 ߚଵ଴ ൅ ߤଵ௝௧ ቋ………………………………..……………….(6) 
Substituting equation 6 into 5 and rearranging gives us the final reduced form in equation 7. 
ܱܷܴܶ௜௝௧݋ݎ	ܷܵܵ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൌ ߚ଴଴ ൅෍ߚ଴ଵ೙ܥ ௝ܸ௧
ଷ
௡
൅ ߚଵ଴ܴ݁ ௜݃௝௧ ൅ ෍ ߚଶ௠ܼ௜௝௧
ହ
௠ୀଵ
൅		 
ߤ଴௝௧ ൅	ߤଵ௝௧ܴ݁ ௜݃௝௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧…………………………………………. (7) 
 
This final equation (7) random-effects model. The first row of the reduced form model can be 
thought of as the “fixed effect part” because their coefficients are specific, whereas the last 
row on equation (7) represents the “random effect part because their coefficient are based on 
changes in the countries MFIs are located. 
 
Data and Sample Size Justification   
The empirical data for this study is from the MIX Market on SSA countries 
(www.mixmarket.org), a nongovernmental organization that aims to promote information 
exchange and transparency in the microfinance industry. Such data contains the best publicly 
available cross-country data on individual MFI’s balance sheets and performance indicators. 
MFIs also report outreach and administrative measures to the MIX, which are accessible 
through their database. Again, the MFIs are selected based on the quality and extent of their 
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data. It provides detailed information on financial, operational and social performance of 
MFIs worldwide. Using the MIX data in addition is said to be the valid data because 
researchers worldwide on MFIs uses it comprehensively and the data determines and limits 
their businesses and products, and specifies criteria and standards for the sound and 
sustainable operations of MFIs (Chaves & Gonzalez-Vega, 1992; Gallardo, 2002; Seelig & 
Novoa, 2009) For the empirical analysis, the dataset consists of annual data on MFIs in 30 
SSA countries collected from the MIX database 2014. The data year spans from 2002 to 
2012. In addition, the study also uses data from the World Bank Data Indicators and World 
Governance indicators for country characteristics. Using data from World Bank website was 
to look for where information on country specific variables such as the GDP per capita and 
Inflation rate from the online data stream. In addition, data on regulatory quality were 
extracted from the 8th edition of the Governance Matters report where five other dimensions 
of governance are measured between 2002 and 2012. 
The sample size for the study is unbalanced panel constituting 30 countries and 576 
MFIs, which gives a total of 1237 sample size. Upon managing the data and accounting for 
unique/missing values in the sustainability and outreach indicators, final sample size for 
study dropped from 1237 on sustainability and outreach indicators. The differences are given 
below: 
 Sustainability (OSS) sample size = 1229 observations. This constitutes 30 countries 
and 360 MFIs 
 Outreach (PFB) sample size = 968 observations. This constitutes 30 countries and 317 
MFIs 
 Outreach (ALBPB) sample size = 1122 observations. This constitutes 30 countries 
and 330 MFIs 
 Outreach (NAB) sample size = 1130 observations. This is made up of 30 countries 
and 330 MFIs 
 
Definition and measurement of variables 
Table 1 presents the definition and measurement of the variable for the study.  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
RESULTS. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of variables used in estimating the effect of regulation 
on MFIs Outreach and Sustainability in SSA. The mean and standard deviations measures the 
averages of the variables and the spread around the mean values respectively, while the 
minimum and maximum captures the range of variables used in the analysis. The standard 
deviations in Table 2 is averagely smaller than the mean values of the variables with the 
exception of average loan balance per borrower (ALBPB), this is an indicative that there isn’t 
grater variations in our variables for the study. This is shown in Table 2. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
MFI’s Outreach by Regulatory Status 
Figure 1 shows the extent of outreach by microfinance institutions using different measures. 
On the average, at one percent significance level, it is evident that regulated institutions 
decrease depth of outreach but increase breadth of outreach than non-regulated institutions. 
That is, regulated institutions offer higher larger loan sizes (ALBPB, 1.269) than non-
regulated institution (ALBPB, 0.574). And this is also evident as regulated institutions on the 
average serve fewer women (PFB, 0.577) than non-regulated institutions (PFB, 0.685). This 
could mean that regulation can be seen associated with additional cost to the institutions and 
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these institutions may try to look for means to cover such cost for which some of the MFIs 
may end up marginalizing the poor as a way of overcoming their cost (Staschen, 2010). 
 On the contrary, regulated MFIs, on the average have higher breadth of outreach 
(NAB, 9.211) than non-regulated MFIs (NAB, 8.998). This could add to the fact raised 
previously that regulation is associated with an additional cost to the financial institutions and 
this compel the institutions to cut off the pro-poor or marginalize the pro-poor and end up 
serving the marginal poor which leads to increase in the breadth of outreach as revealed in the 
study. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
In the regression analysis, this paper set forth to study the effects of regulation on MFIs 
sustainability and outreach using a multilevel estimation technique to address problem of 
heterogeneity in data. To this end, MFIs indicators of sustainability (OSS) and outreach; 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower (ALBPB), Proportion of Female Borrower (PFB), 
Number of Active Borrower (NAB) and were regressed on regulatory variables, and MFIs 
characteristics such as age, type of MFI and other covariates of MFI as indicated in Table 3 
 
          [TABLE 3] 
 
Post-estimation tests such as the likelihood-ratio (lrtest) and intraclass correlation (ICC), 
normality test were conducted to test for model specification and goodness-of fit respectively. 
The lr test results show that the model is correctly specified and suggests that the model is of 
good-fit. This is an indicative that there is a statistically significant difference between a 
simple regression model and the use of multilevel estimation technique for this study. 
Implying that, choosing the multilevel estimation for this analysis is deemed appropriate and 
the random coefficients model provides a better fit. With regard to the inter-class correlation 
coefficient (ICC) for the two model indicators, sustainability (17.2%) and outreach (35.12%, 
21.58% and 23.06%), show the reliability of the results. That is, the conditional assumption 
that the random country effect is not different from zero, which indicates the correlation of 
measurements within the same individual and the proportion of variance explained by the 
individual random effect. The study fails to accept such assumption that the conditional 
assumption of random country effect is not different from zero. A normality test also 
conducted in the residuals to detect if the errors follow a standard normal distribution, since 
the errors are expected to be normally distributed in any good-fitting model. The normality 
test on the residuals show that the predicted errors are normally distributed around the mean.  
 
Regulation in the study is meant all forms of regulation that an MFI is subject to and it is 
measured as a dummy, indicating that whether the MFI is regulated or not. Taking 
cognizance of the nature of the hierarchical nature of the data, we began estimating a single 
equation by employing a two stage level analysis to offset clustering effect problem likely to 
bias the result of the models.  The study focuses on one main variable - regulation - and how 
it affects the outcome of MFIs sustainability and outreach.  
 Compared to non-regulated institutions, regulating additional MFI leads to 0.089 units 
higher in sustainability. This means, regulated MFIs are better off than non-regulated 
institutions in terms of sustainability. This is in consonance with public interest theory of 
regulation and supports Cull et al. (2009) and Okumu (2007). We found that in the short term 
regulation positively affects the sustainability of MFIs. However, this finding contradicts the 
findings of (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007) who found that regulation does not directly affect 
the sustainability of the MFIs. From the depth of outreach result, the study shows that 
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regulation is negatively related to the depth of outreach as indicated by a negative sign to 
PFB and positive sign ALBPB at 10 percent significance level. Regulating one more MFI is 
associated with a reduction in PFB by 0.061 units lesser than non-regulated MFIs and 
increases in ALBPB by 0.552 units higher than non-regulated MFIs all other things being 
equal. The results show that regulated MFIs are likely to charge /or offer larger amount of 
loan sizes to their clients as well as decreasing the extent of outreach services they offer to 
their female clients. This result is in consistent with the study by Okumu (2007) and Kablan 
(2013) who argue that reforms (regulation) decrease outreach (depth) while financial 
sustainability increases. But this result fail to confirm that of Pati (2012) which confirms that 
regulation does not significantly affect the performance of MFIs activity. However, the 
breadth of outreach result reveals that regulation significantly and positively affects the 
breadth of MFIs outreach. At 5 percent significance level, regulating one more MFI is 
associated with 44.1 percentage points increases in number of active borrowers (NAB) than 
non-regulated institutions holding all other variables constant across country and overtime. 
This indicates that regulation increases the breadth of outreach for regulated MFIs. This 
finding confirms Mawumba (2012) who argued that regulation significantly affects the 
outreach of MFIs. These findings could also be associated to what pertains in literature, that 
regulation comes with additional cost (Staschen, 2010), so when the institutions are regulated 
it becomes expensive for them to serve poorer clients hence cuts off the active poor clients 
and end up serving marginal poor clients. 
 On the relationship between perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development, it is found that regulatory quality significantly and positively improves the 
sustainability of MFIs, regulatory quality also has a positive sign across all the outreach 
indicators but significant in the depth of outreach. A unit increase in regulatory quality is 
associated with 0.147 unit increases in sustainability, 0.548 unit increase in proportion of 
female borrowers and 0.038 increase in average loan sizes at a 5 percent, 10 percent and 1 
percent significance levels respectively. Thus, the effectiveness of government in 
contributing to the development of private institution development is seen crucial as indicated 
by the result. This result however fails to confirm the work of Barth et al., (2004) who 
postulates that there is no evidence of positive impact of higher regulatory power on financial 
institutions performance and evaluation. 
 With reference to new institution young institutions are less sustainable by 0.089 units 
at 5 percent significant level. Lower and matured institutions are more sustainable at 1 
percent significance level by 0.072 units higher than new institutions respectively. Only 
matured institutions are significant in both the PFB and the ALBPB model. However, the 
result is a bit puzzling. At 10 percent, matured MFIs decrease their outreach of PFB by 0.009 
units lower than new institutions holding all other variables constant. This indicates that, 
matured institutions end up serving the marginal poor at the expense of the active poor. In the 
PFB model, matured institutions are seen to decrease the extent of their outreach to women 
borrowers. However, the scenario is different in the ALBPB model, as matured institutions 
offers smaller loan sizes than new institutions. This is evident in the result with a negative 
coefficient in the ALBPB, although not significant.  Age of the institution in the breadth of 
outreach result indicates that at 1 percent significance level, young institutions decrease 
number of active borrowers by 57.9 percentage points lower and matured institutions at 1 
percent significant level increase number of active borrowers by 67.2 percentage points 
higher than new institutions respectively all other variables remaining constant across country 
and overtime. This finding could imply that as MFIs thrive long in the industry, the 
likelihood for such institutions to serve wealthier clients is likely to be anticipated. And this 
could be contributed to why matured institutions decrease outreach to women and are more 
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likely to be sustainable. The result indicates that the longer institution thrive in the industry, 
the least likelihood for the institution to serve poorer clients.  
 Controlling for interest rate, deposits, and capital, the study found that a unit increase 
in interest rate, deposits, and capital leads to 0.335, 0.187 and 0.317 points increase in OSS at 
1 percent significance levels respectively across country and over time all other things being 
constant. Hence, MFIs that take deposit from the people are more likely to be sustainable 
than non-deposits taking MFIs. In addition MFIs with larger capital base is seen to improve 
their sustainability level. GDP/Capita and inflation were all significant at 10 and 5 percent 
respectively. A dollar increase in GDP/Capita and inflation, leads to a 0.091 and 0.004 points 
increase in the sustainability of MFIs respectively. This shows that in times of higher 
inflation, most MFIs have developed strategies to improve their activities (Hartarska & 
Nadolnyak, 2007). In the depth of outreach model interest rate, deposits, and capital are 
significant in the PFB model results. At a 1 and 10 percent significance levels, a unit increase 
in interest rate and deposits, leads to 0.138 unit increase and 0.049 unit decrease in PFB 
respectively holding all variables constant. The positive relation in the interest rate and 
women reached by MFIs could add to the notion that women are less sensitive to interest rate 
and are ever ready to pay for rates charged on loans. In the ALBPB model results, at 1 
significant level, a unit increase in interest rate, capital is associated with a 0.996 decrease in 
ALBPB and 0.027 points decrease in depth of outreach in ALBPB model respectively 
holding all other factors constant across country and overtime. Hence, deposit taken 
institutions are seen to cut off poorer clients. One striking feature is that institutions with 
bigger capital base are seen to decrease depth of outreach. And this could mean that such 
institutions are rather serving the marginal poor in an attempt to increase profit. Other 
covariates such as type of MFI, region of operation, GDP/Capita play significant role in the 
sustainability and outreach results. 
 
Discussion  
The association between regulation and MFIs core objective (outreach and sustainability) has 
been explored by researchers in with different methodology.  In view of this evidence, the 
current study sought to investigate the effect of regulation on MFIs outreach and 
sustainability in SSA using a multilevel methodological approach in a region which has 
received little attention in terms of research on the topic. The study revealed that regulation 
indeed affects the activities of the microfinance institutions in SSA. That is, regulation affects 
MFIs core objective in terms of sustainability and outreach. The study again revealed that 
MFIs activities in SSA could improve sustainably when the institutions are regulated. In 
addition, the study further revealed that regulation id likely to associate with additional costs 
and this compels some of microfinance institutions to cut off from serving poorer clients as 
evident in the results on a decrease in depth of outreach but positive to the MFIs 
sustainability. As a result, it is evident that institutions that marginalise the poor end up 
widening their breadth of outreach by serving wealthier clients. Again, deposit taking 
institutions are seen to be sustainable and serve fewer poorer clients. The depth of outreach 
model revealed that regulation decreases depth of outreach which is evident by the two 
measurements of breath of outreach (Average Loan Balance per Borrower and Proportion of 
Female Borrowers). 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Regulation does good to the microfinance institutions by ensuring sound financial positions 
by the MFIs but the likelihood for the institutions goal or core objective to be shifted is likely 
to manifest. This is so because regulation and the depth of outreach have negative 
relationship. In addition, effort by government to ensure sound and conducive environment to 
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enhance private investment activities was also seen to contribute immensely to the 
development of MFIs activities. This was evident in the quality of regulation as the quality 
sees to improve the sustainability of the MFIs and also improves outreach positively. Finally, 
the study revealed that institutions that accept deposits from the poor people are more 
sustainable but such institutions tend to serve the marginal poor people. 
 
On the basis of the above findings and conclusions of this study, it is clear that microfinance 
sector is having a great expansion and performing quite well in SSA. This expansion in scale 
and services increase the need for regulation in the sector (SSA). The concern of the 
regulatory authority is the security of the people’s deposits and the soundness of the financial 
market. it is recommended that regulatory authorities, should apply prudential regulation to 
microfinance institutions when: they mobilize deposits from the general public in order to 
strengthen such MFIs financial position so as to safeguard clients deposits and non-prudential 
regulation should be apply to care more on lending efficiency, consumer protection and 
sector development to ensure enabling atmosphere that will enhance the achievement of 
microfinance social objectives. Finally, it is also recommended that regulatory authorities 
should improve their quality of regulation such as strengthening their old existing rules: 
staffing appropriate staffs where needed; ensuring that authorities trust with duty execute 
them properly through monitoring mechanism just to mention few, than implementing new 
rules without the capacity to manage it would not be of great help to the microfinance 
institutions. But ensuring appropriateness and the quality wise in regulation will go a long 
way to improve and ensure efficiency in the microfinance institutions activities in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
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Appendix A 
Correlation Matrix for the Explanatory Variables 
                             Regulated        Age         Region          MFI type        Rate        Deposit     Regulatory quality     GDP/Capita    Inflation 
 Regulated                1.000  
 Age                          0.068*       1.000  
 Region                   -0.097***   -0.086***    1.000  
MFI type                  0.3867**    -0.0278**   0.0218***    1.000  
Rate                         -0.165***   -0.174***    0.264***    -0.0565***    1.000  
Deposit                     0.216***     0.099***  -0.179***     0.3305***    -0.133***    1.000 
Regulatory Quality -0.187***     0.012        -0.131***     -0.0150*        0.175***   -0.099***         1.000    
 lnGDP/Capita         -0.011          0.033        -0.107***      0.0333**       0.205***    0.148 ***       0.328***          1.000 
Inflation                   -0.113***   -0.039        0.089***      -0.0861***    -0.139***  -0.158***        -0.083***         -0.272***     1.000 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01  
Source: Computed from MIX Data, WGI and
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Status 
Country Not Regulated   
  
Regulated Total 
Angola 2 5 7 
Benin 4 70 74 
Burkina Faso 3 45 48 
Burundi 1 12 13 
Cameroon 4 45 4 
Central African Republic 1 4 5 
Chad 0 7 7 
Congo, Democratic Rep 5 28 33 
Congo, Republic of the 2 9 11 
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory) 3 35 38 
Ethiopia 2 91 93 
Ghana 25 112 137 
Guinea 2 16 18 
Kenya 49 40 89 
Madagascar 0 45 45 
Malawi 6 21 27 
Mali 3 58 61 
Mozambique 19 30 49 
Namibia 5 3 8 
Niger 2 17 19 
Nigeria 5 56 61 
Rwanda 7 38 45 
Senegal 0 67 67 
Sierra Leone 6 8 14 
South Africa 1 14 15 
Swaziland 2 5 7 
Tanzania 28 22 50 
Togo 1 52 53 
Uganda 20 52 72 
Zambia 1 19 20 
Zimbabwe 1 1 2  
Total 207 1030 1237 
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Variable Definition Measurement A priori sign 
NAB SUS PFB/ALBPB 
Regulation Regulatory status     Dummy + + - 
Interest Rate 
Real gross portfolio yield for interest 
rate    Continuous + + +/- 
Deposit Ratio of saving to total assets Continuous - + - 
Capital Ratio of total equity to total assets Continuous + + + 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Government effectiveness to   
strengthen private institutions Continuous + + +
lnGDP/Capita 
Logarithm of GDP per capita in 
constant 1995 US dollars  Continuous + +/- +/- 
Inflation percentage of change of the GDP CPI Continuous + +/- + 
MFI type Type of microfinance institutional  Dummies + +/- + 
Region Regional Dummies Dummies + +/- + 
 Age Age of Institutions Dummies +/- +/- +/- 
Source : Author, 2015 
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics for Variables used for the Analysis 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
Deviation. 
Minimum Maximum 
OSS 1229 1.064 0.454 -0.391 8.416 
PFB 968 0.596 0.253 0.004 1.256 
ALBPB 1122 1.183 2.406 0.001 42.667 
lNAB 1130 9.156 1.680 2.398 13.595 
Regulatory Status 1237 - - 0.000 1.000 
Age  1255 - - 1.000 3.000 
Region 1229 - - 1.000 5.000 
MFI type 1227 - - 1.000 3.000 
Rate 1229 0.271 0.231 -0.247 2.762 
Capital 1227 0.295 0.353 0.005 1.000 
Savings 1229 0.416 0.361 0.000 5.702 
Regulatory Quality 1229 0.493 0.400 -2.053 0.778 
lnGDP/Capita 1229 6.181 0.613 4.892 8.680 
Inflation(CPI) 1225 8.836 6.982 -8.975 44.391 
Computed from MIX Data, WGI and WDI, 2002-2012 
15 | P a g e  
 
 Figure 1: Outreach by MFIs Regulatory status 
Source: Computed from Mix Market data from 2002-2012 
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Table 3: REGRESSION RESULTS  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
OSS PFB ALBPB lNAB 
Explanatory Variable (Fixed 
Parameters ) 
Regulated 0.089**  -0.061* 0.552* 0.441** 
(0.044)    (0.034) (0.316) (0.220) 
Age of Institution (Base= New 
Institutions) 
Young institutions -0.089**  -0.008 0.006 0.579***
(0.036)    (0.024) (0.215) (0.164) 
Matured institutions 0.072*** -0.009* -0..152 0.672***
(0.027)    (0.005) (0.162) (0.110) 
Region(Base=Western) 
Eastern 0.042    -0.075 -0.434 0.430***
(0.061)    (0.050) (0.449) (0.068) 
Central 0.086   
-
0.266*** 1.155** 0.252
(0.065)    (0.051) (0.474) (0.365) 
Southern 
-
0.177*** -0.130 0.257 0.107 
(0.066)    (0.053) (0.471) (0.375) 
Indian Ocean island 0.019 -0.176 0.077 0.264 
(0.144) (0.134) (1.268) (0.836) 
MFI type(Base=NGO) 
NBFI 0.025 
-
0.154*** 0.304 -0.248* 
(0.032)    (0.020) (0.170) (0.131) 
Banks & Rural Banks 0.110** 
-
0.219*** 0.740*** 0.349** 
(0.043)    (0.019) (0.160) (0.177) 
Interest rate 0.335*** 0.138*** -0.996*** -0.059 
(0.056)    (0.043) (0.352) (0.239) 
Deposits 0.187*** -0.280* 0.027* -0.467** 
(0.050)    (0.036) (0.013) (0.227) 
Capital 0.317*** -0.049 -1.064*** -0.334 
(0.049)    (0.034) (0.222) (0.206) 
Regulatory Quality 0.147** 0.548* 0.0385*** 0.393 
(0.064)  (0.264) (0.038) (0.206) 
GDP/Capita 0.091*    -0.099** -0.440 0.196 
(0.055) (0.045) (0.397) (0.299) 
Inflation 0.004**  0.002* -0.009 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.012) (0.008) 
Constant 0.105 1.341*** 4.374 7.049***
(0.331)    (0.265) (2.338) (1.790) 
Random Parameters 
Regulation 0.015*** 0.015*** 1.150*** 0.447* 
(0.006)    (0.006) (0.154) (0.215) 
Constant 0.012*** 0.010 0.015** 0.127** 
(0.002)    (0.005) (0.006) (0.115) 
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Residual 0.133*** 0.046*** 4.234*** 1.915***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.138) (0.831) 
Sample Size 1229 968 1122 1130 
Standard Errors in parentheses  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
lr test chi2(2) 37.58 48.42 130.10 72.43 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ICC 17.2% 35.12% 21.58% 23.06% 
